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From premiums to payouts: Who’s behind the
malpractice crisis, anyway?
James W. Jones, MD, PhD, MHA,* Laurence B. McCullough, PhD,* and Bruce W. Richman, MA,
Houston, TexasIt is now, as it was then and as it may ever be; conceptions
from the past blind us to facts which almost slap us in the
face.
William Stewart Halsted, Surgical Papers, vol. II
With the passing of each year since the turn of the
new millennium, your malpractice rates have risen by
over 20% as your reimbursements have dropped. Your
medical malpractice insurance premiums have reduced
your net income more than any other single cost of
practice. Most physicians have never experienced a mal-
practice allegation or lawsuit to account for the descent
of this plague upon the medical profession. Hospital
and medical school administrators report that insur-
ance rates for institutions are advancing even more
sharply than for individual physicians and may soon
affect their ability to fund charitable or marginally
profitable health-care programs. As a leader in your
medical community and in your national specialty orga-
nization, and as a vascular surgeon paying premiums at a
much higher rate than many colleagues in less exposed
and life-threatening specialties, what should you do?
A. Insurance companies have colluded to gouge their
physician customers. Target them in your professional
society’s political activities.
B. Plaintiffs’ attorneys are responsible for 90% of the mal-
practice crisis and must be brought under control.
Target them.
C. Juries are awarding larger and larger verdicts. Agitate
to change a judicial system that empowers lay juries to
pass judgment on complex medical and scientific ques-
tions.
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doi:10.1016/j.jvs.2005.12.038D. Physicians are mostly to blame. Modify physician be-
havior toward patients and police renegade physicians
representing themselves as expert witnesses.
E. Patients are filing more suits. Educate the public that
frivolous suits are jeopardizing the viability of a medical
profession that exists to help them.
Regular readers of this journal’s monthly commentaries
on surgical ethics have likely noted that our comments
typically address how surgeons should, as a matter of ethical
obligation, behave toward their patients and the institu-
tional structures that support their practices. This month
we will instead explore whether physicians, particularly
those who work in what insurers classify and bill as “high-
risk” specialties, are themselves being treated ethically
within the socioeconomic network they help to sustain. If
not, how might they most effectively direct their attention
toward limiting malpractice indemnity rates and better
controlling those elements of the adjudication system that
most of us agree sometimes functions unjustly? Like every-
one else, surgeons want to be treated ethically. No sensible
person, no matter how otherwise self-interested, advocates
the crippling or destruction of our profession. Many of us
have nonetheless felt this threat, and some have taken such
extreme measures as closing their practices, discontinuing
certain procedures, or relocating to escape the terrors of the
existing medical malpractice tort system in all its manifes-
tations, from insurance premiums to jury findings. There is
a widespread belief, within and without the profession, that
a socially endemic ethical failure lies at the base of these
problems and that everyone is placed at risk by it. Doctors
have always grumbled about the cost of malpractice insur-
ance premiums, but early in this decade malpractice rates
began rising at rates steep enough to threaten disruption of
the medical care system. Many have questioned the legiti-
macy of the steep rise in premium costs, which are generally
believed to far, far exceed the cost of indemnity and to
exceed what many specialists have calculated they can af-
ford if they are to continue to practice in an economically
sustainable fashion.
Only a handful of fingers are necessary to do the
pointing at potential causes. First, are the premium in-
635
JOURNAL OF VASCULAR SURGERY
March 2006636 Jones, McCullough, and Richmancreases a response to higher costs within the insurance
industry or a deliberate profiteering conspiracy among the
carriers? The National Association of Insurance Commis-
sioners (NAIC) reports that physicians’ malpractice premi-
ums in all 50 states increased from 2000 to 2003 (the last
available data year) by a whopping 67%, from $6.38 billion
to $10.65 billion. Every available resource indicates that
the higher premiums still failed to meet the insurers’ costs
of coverage. In 2002, insurers paid out $1.65 for every
premium dollar collected from physicians.1 The loss ratio
on premiums fell to $1.37 in 2003.2 Data from the NAIC
were in the same range, showing a 43% loss in 2002 and a
28.6% loss in 2003. Premium revenue is of course not the
carriers’ only income; their average total profit from all
sources, primarily capital investments, in 2003 was 5.3%,
not exactly a killing.
Why did the cost of doing business in the medical
malpractice insurance industry escalate as it did? The abso-
lute number of physician malpractice cases nationwide has
not varied much since 1999, when 15,093 adjudicated or
settled payouts were recorded in the National Practitioners
Data Bank (NPDB). There were 15,289 such reports in
2003 annual entries, an increase of only 1.3%.3
Likewise, the data don’t confirm beliefs that routinely
outlandish jury awards are driving the problem. Awards of
$1 million or more per case tend to make good newspaper
copy, and just a few of them can create a general impression
that they are the normative outcomes of medical malprac-
tice trials. They aren’t.4 Figures like these are almost always
associated with cases involving death or permanent disabil-
ity as a result of negligence or incompetent care.5 Other-
wise, the NPDB reports that the average malpractice pay-
ment in 2003 was $294,814. This compares to an inflation-
adjusted average since the NPDB began to compile
statistics in 1990 of $251,000, not much of a difference.
When these data are calculated for 2003, the total national
payout on medical malpractice claims was $4.5 billion, not
including the substantial costs of defending cases won and
lost. Sixty-seven percent of filed malpractice cases are dis-
missed or dropped without an award or cash settlement to
the plaintiff.6 Each case filed, important or frivolous, is a
potential loss of millions of insurance company dollars and
must be defended by top attorneys at escalating legal costs.
Furthermore, when absolute dollars, unadjusted for infla-
tion, are calculated, the effect is multiplied over time,
costing the insurance industry more and more each year
just to stay even, and insured physicians have those costs
passed directly on to them in the form of ever-higher
premiums.
Dark rumors waft about from time to time proposing
bizarre manipulations of the regulatory authorities by the
insurance companies. Some physician leaders believe the
present malpractice rate increases are secondary to the insur-
ers’ desire to avoid paying taxes on the windfall profits of the
late 1990s,4 or that they are intended to cover investment
losses incurred in the dot-com bust and the bear market
years that opened the 21st century. Others have postulated
that insurers periodically encourage lawsuits, happily pay-ing losses to justify a new wave of rate increases. Were these
conspiratorial theories true, they would certainly reflect
poorly on the business sense of people who make their
livings by calculating long-term probabilities with high
actuarial exactitude. More to the point, they just don’t pass
the sniff test.
Most physicians nevertheless resent the fact that their
premiums increase every year even though they’ve never
been sued. Clearly, this reflects an insurance system in
which the whole medical profession supports the extraor-
dinary costs incurred by a few of its members so that carriers
can stay in the business of indemnifying us all against
allegations of medical malpractice and of paying the penal-
ties for actual medical malpractice when it occurs. No
individual physician can pay premiums sufficient to cover
the cost to the insurer if he or she loses a major adjudicated
malpractice action. The insurance company pays not only
the cost of the award to the limits of its coverage if the case
is lost but also the cost of legal defense for all insured
physicians charged with poor practice, guilty and innocent
alike. Despite increasing premiums and popular mythol-
ogy, the medical malpractice insurance business is really not
lucrative—many carriers have discontinued medical mal-
practice coverage or declined to write new policies in the
last several years.
It has been suggested that plaintiffs’ attorneys rush to
file multiple malpractice suits. Each case is a lottery ticket,
one more chance to hit the big one. It follows that patients
with a real or perceived grievance find their pathway into
court lubricated by the contingency fee arrangement,
which ensures that there is usually no cost to the plaintiff
unless there is an award or settlement. The attorney collects
and has the considerable expenses of prosecution reim-
bursed only if he wins the case for his injured client. Because
the contingency arrangement requires the malpractice at-
torney to run the risk of no return and substantial losses, the
prudent attorney accepts only cases he or she reliably be-
lieves can be won for a significant award. By subjecting the
patient’s claims to a self-interested attorney’s trained scru-
tiny before they are brought before a court, the contin-
gency fee model actually reduces the total number of cases
filed. With his own livelihood at stake, the attorney will
necessarily screen out frivolous or poorly substantiated
claims by declining to represent them. In a survey of 113
plaintiffs’ medical malpractice attorneys, most ranked the
economic burden of the injury, physician worthiness, and
potential for compensation as the factors most influencing
their decisions to file suit on behalf of clients.7 Suits were
most often filed when patients were more seriously injured,
when patients had higher paying jobs before injury, and
when the physician’s credentials were suspect. When attor-
neys agreed to work without fee and assume all prosecution
costs in exchange for a percentage of the award or settle-
ment, however, the essential deciding factor was the poten-
tial for winning the case.
How does an attorney contemplating contingency
work decide which cases are most likely to be won at trial?
Characteristics of the injury, the patient, and the physician
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lates to the validity of the overall conceptualization”.7 A
physician expert is contacted and asked to review the med-
ical record and provide an opinion based on the evidence.
One quarter to one half of patients who seek counsel with
the intention of suing a doctor, and more than half when an
attorney actually accepted the case, were told by other
health professionals that their care was not satisfactory.8 In
100% of malpractice actions formally filed by a sensible and
experienced attorney, however, a well-compensated physi-
cian expert reviewed the medical records and advised the
plaintiff’s attorney that his potential client was indeed a
victim of medical malpractice.
This is of course a conclusion the aggrieved patient/
client is pleased to hear because it validates his belief. It is
the conclusion the plaintiff ’s attorney is content to hear
because therein lies a potential source of income. It is the
conclusion the “expert consultant” is pleased to provide
because it insures that he will be further engaged and
additionally compensated on the case, and likely on subse-
quent cases of a similar nature. The system has an abun-
dance of professional experts who find a comfortable sup-
plement to their livelihoods in encouraging attorneys to
pursue malpractice cases. Should the ethical consultant
repeatedly advise inquiring attorneys after reviewing the
medical records that insufficient cause exists for a claim of
medical malpractice, he or she is likely to notice that he is
receiving fewer and fewer incoming calls from acquaintan-
ces in the legal profession. They will become increasingly
popular among plaintiffs’ attorneys when regularly shading
evaluations of how other physicians managed a case to
support counsel’s role as the complainant’s advocate. With-
out “experts” who abandon professional integrity and
pump poisoned air into the system, it is probable that
medicine would see decreases rather than a steady rate of
malpractice cases arriving in court, with all the associated
costs receding.
Every seasoned physician knows the shameful state of
medical expert witnessing; its most egregious features
blacken the integrity of both the medical and the legal
professions. Fair and impartial expert testimony must be
available to plaintiff and defendant alike. Expert testimony
should be the province of practicing physicians with exten-
sive and demonstrable scientific or clinical experience with
the problem under debate. Professional medical expert
witnesses, for sale to the highest bidder and willing to argue
either side in a malpractice case, have severely compromised
the integrity of the tort system.9 Advocacy masquerading as
expert testimony has become the primary cause of unjust
outcomes in the trial of medical malpractice cases by intro-
ducing scientifically false standards of care. Judges, juries,
and attorneys on either side of a suit are not trained or
otherwise able to distinguish a genuine physician expert
from a skillful charlatan. Comportment, appearance, and
articulateness on the witness stand are typically the medical
layman’s only basis for assessing the actual authority of
expert witnesses who are so-certified by the loose standards
of the legal profession.So long as the medical profession does not act to
restore integrity to medical expert witnessing, these intel-
lectually decrepit “standards” will continue to plague the
only regulatory device society has left at its disposal, mal-
practice litigation. Only the medical profession can identify
and take action against those of its own who would exag-
gerate their mastery of the field and falsely impugn the
ability and integrity of colleagues for personal enrichment
and self-aggrandizement. The American College of Sur-
geons and allied professional organizations acknowledged
the importance of fair and just expert witness testimony in
recently published criteria requiring that witnesses “uphold
certain professional principles.” The College of Surgeons’
document disallows expert advocacy and requires its mem-
bers to agree to peer review of their testimony when re-
quested, a good start toward more honest, disinterested,
evidence-based expert opinions.
Some state medical boards propose to discipline physi-
cians proven to have given false or misleading expert wit-
ness testimony. Implementing this proposal may eventually
cause the most persistent and intentional offenders to
pause, but there are considerable limitations. These include
the high volume of retributive claims, the limited expertise
and resources available to medical boards, the difficulty of
proving fraudulent testimony in complex cases, and a po-
tential dampening effect on even the most legitimate expert
testimony. Similar problems would likely be encountered if
our professional specialty organizations were to attempt
review of members’ unethical behavior in the courtroom.
Policing the entire medical profession to eliminate false
or biased expert testimony is clearly not possible. Perhaps
medicine should address the problem of inept and dishon-
est expert witnesses acting as surreptitious advocates by
providing independent experts with integrity, who are cer-
tified as such by the medical profession rather than by the
legal profession. The American Association for the Ad-
vancement of Science offers the courts independent experts
as their solution to bad science.10 The federal courts have
begun to accept this approach, with the creation of “sci-
ence panels” for expert testimony.11 Physicians should
take the lead in advocating a similar approach in medical
malpractice cases. A profession-wide decision on the best
mechanism for implementation could be led by the Amer-
ican Medical Association or an ad hoc committee compris-
ing senior representatives of the major specialty organiza-
tions. Legislative adoption of their recommendations
would introduce system-wide changes that would improve
justice for all. But none of these responses to the crisis in
medical malpractice litigation can be initiated by patients,
lawyers, judges, juries, or insurance carriers. They can only
be introduced by physicians.
Although accounting practices can distort corporate
balance sheets, it is unlikely that the insurance industry’s
consistent reports of premium income failing to meet pay-
out expenses are fabrications undetected by state insurance
regulators or the national political interests that have be-
come intensely focused on the medical malpractice crisis.
Physicians nevertheless have little leverage and diminishing
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practice. A few have dared to “go bare,” but hospitals,
group practices, and training institutions will generally not
permit this sort of bravado among practitioners with whom
they share liability. Option A, attacking the insurance in-
dustry, is not the right choice for resolving the medical
malpractice crisis.
It is true that if there were no attorneys there would be
no professional prosecutions of malpractice claims, but
there would also be no tort justice for those harmed by bad
doctors. Option B misdiagnoses the essential lesion and will
not heal the disease that has beset us. The judicial system
has been a foundational component of societal justice. As
far back as the 18th century BC, King Hammurabi of
Babylon established a legal code overseen by judges who
were themselves jeopardized by incorrect outcomes. Guilt
or innocence in Hammurabi’s Code was often decided by a
defendant’s death or survival after being thrown in the
Euphrates River at flood tide. During the sixth century BC
in Greece, public assemblies called Heliaia or heliastic
courts were presided over by routinely bribed magistrates
adjudicating civil and criminal cases. Roman courts used a
corps of professional jurists who closely guarded the pre-
rogatives of the privileged classes. Trial by ordeal, or even
by personal combat between litigants, was normative in
medieval Europe, until ecclesial courts claiming divine
guidance took control of the legal system. This process
culminated in the Holy Inquisition, administered by agents
of the Roman Catholic Church; its abuses, including fabri-
cated and superstitious charges, unchallenged informants,
torture, and quasi-judicial murder are well known. The
alleged infallibility of a self-proclaimed elite has disrupted
the cause of justice in every age, including our own. Perhaps
defendants in medical malpractice cases would be more
justly served by juries of their physician peers, but an
argument would surely be made that a guild mentality
would prejudice such jurors against complainants. Despite
its obvious shortcomings, no one has yet found a judicial
system more consistently incorruptible and better sensi-
tized to the demands of justice than trial by a panel of lay
jurors who, because they are citizens too, are indeed phy-
sicians’ peers. Until the course of history can finally agree
upon a superior alternative, Option C is not a realistic
course of action.
Only a very small percentage of patients harmed by
medical malpractice go on to file lawsuits. The statistics
show that the number of suits has remained remarkably
constant since the National Databank was established. Very
few patients seek personal enrichment through frivolous or
intentionally fabricated claims of medical malpractice, andeven fewer attorneys will facilitate their access to the court-
house. The rationale for Option E is just another myth.
As painful as it is to acknowledge, Option D is the
correct choice. Rogue physicians representing themselves
as medical experts do more to contaminate the medical
malpractice tort system and drive up all its associated costs,
from premiums to payouts, than all the accidental and
intentional misbehaviors of insurance companies, plaintiffs’
attorneys, malevolent patients, and clueless juries com-
bined. The medical profession does not belong to them; it
is, as Thomas Percival argued two centuries ago, a public
trust.12 The available data further confirm that malpractice
suits most typically follow not when physicians lack techni-
cal competence or good clinical judgment, but when they
fail to display compassion for the unintended suffering their
treatment has visited upon their patients. Patients who feel
that their doctor is listening to them don’t often feel the
need to have an attorney or a jury listen to them. Once a
properly-treated but aggrieved patient contacts an attor-
ney, the necessary factor for a complaint to become a case is
the unscrupulous physician “expert” who is circling the scene,
looking for opportunities to provide well-compensated advo-
cacy disguised as wisdom without regard to the principles
of good medicine or justice. A terrible ethical failure lies
there, among our own.
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